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Transient identification in Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is often a very hard task and may involve a great amount
of human cognition. The early identification of unexpected departures from steady state behavior is an essential
step for the operation, control and accident management in NPPs. The bases for the transient identification relay
on the evidence that different system faults and anomalies lead to different pattern evolution in the involved
process variables. During an abnormal event, the operator must monitor a great amount of information from the
instruments that represents a specific type of event. Several systems based on specialist systems, neural-
networks, and fuzzy logic have been developed for transient identification. In the work, we investigate the
possibility of using a Neuro-Fuzzy modeling tool for efficient transient identification, aiming to helping the
operator crew to take decisions relative to the procedure to be followed in situations of accidents/transients at
NPPs. The proposed system uses artificial neural networks (ANN) as first level transient diagnostic. After the
ANN has done the preliminary transient type identification, a fuzzy-logic system analyzes the results emitting
reliability degree of it. A preliminary evaluation of the developed system was made at the Human-System
Interface Laboratory (LABIHS). The obtained results show that the system can help the operators to take
decisions during transients/accidents in the plant.
1. INTRODUCTION
The growing demand for safety in production processes has justified the search for
prevention methods and possible location of faults by software using Artificial Intelligence
techniques. In the specific case of nuclear energy, the interruption of production or any
anomaly may mean, besides the great economic loss, severe environmental damage and loss
of lives. Then, in a nuclear plant, there is a need to identify abnormal events more quickly,
since the conditions of the mill change due to any anomaly. The monitoring, conducted by the
operators, can be accomplished with the aid of alarms, limiting the field of search.
The operators performace in a nuclear accident situation will be optimized as a result of na
idetification system that will assist them in the identification such as the resolution and
decisions about any incident. The consequent evolution of the 2 plant codition has relied,
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mainly,the ability of operators to correctly identify the events and implement appropriate
actions if it´s necessary.
The research development on artificial neural networks – one method to solve artificial
intelligence problems - has been very useful helping to control production processes. Playing
circuits that simulate the human brain with mathematical models, are techniques that allow
the acquisition of knowledge through experience. The differential is the network ability to
learn using a limited set of examples for, from there, producing results and answers, even for
data not available at the beginning. This work will present a technique for identifying a
transient nuclear power plant, using artificial intelligence, with a fuzzy logic system.
I 2.  NEURAL NETWORS IN TRANSIENT CLASSIFICATION
Developing this work, it was chosen the model of ANN-type multilayer with
backpropagation training algorithm. This choice was motivated by its wide use, ability to
generalize and, particularly, the good results obtained in the accident identification in nuclear
plants, when these accidents were part of the network overall training. However, due to the
problem of "false patterns, transient identification systems based only on this type of
networks had some limitations, especially regarding the absence of the output" I do not know
"to events outside the training scope. Besides this problem, one should be careful with other
deficiencies inherent in this type of network, such as the slowness of the algorithm for
connections adjustment to complex surfaces and the possibility of that converge to local
minimum. To improve the network performance and the specific  problem of identifying the
areas where transients are complex, it was adopted the model of multi-type ANN jump.
Figure 1 shows this network with an input layer, two intermediate layers and an output layer.
Figure 1. ANN jump
The “backpropagation” method application, in this type of ANN is a result, in general, of the
actualized conations (∆wji(n)), through the following equations:
                                                                                      (1)
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where k represents any neuron of the further layers relative to the neuron layer  j, δ(n) is the
local gradient, yi is the neuron output i F(.) is the activation function, aj(n) is the  activation
of the neuron j and wki is the synapse between the neuron k and i.
To increase the abiliity of generalization and robustness of the network, it is necessary to
generate noise, making a powerful lot of patterns that are presented to the network during the
training. This is done by adding examples of patterns with overlapped noise and "forcing"
through the training. The network recognizes these new examples as belonging to their
original classes (no noise). However, this type of ANN architecture - because it is not
primarily the classifier type  - allows that the figures in its output, in response to input
patterns that represent the same event, float around the expected discrete value. The system
presented in the previous section demonstrated a good capacity of generalization and
robustness with respect to noise. However, the ANN architecture used by the system, by not
recur in their internal structure (where there is a direct dependence with time), was not able to
work directly with dynamical systems. Thus, to overcome this limitation, it adopted the
“temporal moving window”.
For the ANN be able to "learn" how to recognize the trend of the time series curve, during the
training, each pattern must have, for each input variable, a fixed number of elements, defined
by the width of the window. Table 1 shows how to set up a set of generic training for an
event A and an event B.
In this table, each variable of state belonging to all input variables, (v1, v2 ... VK), uses a
number m of columns as defined by the width of the window, to represent the history of the
variable. By each new line, this historic is dislocated in time, until they use all n elements of
time series.
Table 1: Variables description
variable v1(t) ... variable vk(t) Event Event
Input 1 Input 2 ... Input m ... Input 1 Input 2 ... Input m Output Output
v1(t) v1(t +1) ... v1(t+m) ... vk(t) vk (t +1) ... vk (t+m) A B






















v1 (t+n-m) v1 (t+n-m+1) ... v1 (t+n) ... vk (t+n-m) vk (t+n-m+1) ... vk (t+n) A B
k – number of input variables; m – number of the elements of the “window” ; n – size of the
temporal series
Thus, by making use of this type of ANN in the events identification, it becomes necessary to
associate the continuous values presented at the network output for discrete values that
represent each of the events. For this purpose, it is determined the deviation (Dev) of each
event. This deviation is defined as the difference between the expected value and the value
displayed at the network output for the respective event.
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Dev = | yev - 
∧
y ev|, (3)
where: ev indicates the event, yev is the expected discrete value, 
∧
y ev  is the o valor continuous
value obtained by the ANN
This deviation will be used forward to get the confidence level of each module.
3. EVENT SELECTION SYSTEM
To select the type of event that is occurring, we used a modular structure. This structure is
composed with several modules, called Independent Identification Modules (IIM), where
each is made up with the maximum of four basic neural modules (BNM) based in the ANN
Jump. Each BNM is responsible to identify a specific event among any others. To this end,
each BNM has variables process as input and only two exits, one to represent the event by
which the module is responsible (class A) and the other to represent all other events (class B).
Thus, it was necessary that the ANN of each BNM were trained with two sets of pattern, a set
representing the class A and another set representing the class B. To make the selection, it
was chosen 1 as code for right output (the class that represents the input pattern in progress)
and zero as the code to the other.
Each Identity Event Module consists of a stack of up to four BNM, figure 2, where each of
these modules is responsible for identifying the corresponding event it was trained for.
During the system operation is expected that for a given event X, the BNM responsible for
the event X presents the output A equals 1 (indicating that the event X is running) and the
output B equals zero, and, then, all other modules provide output A equals zero and the
output B equals 1 (indicating that the current event is not their responsibility). Therefore,
every module IIM is capable of identifying up to four events.
Figure 2: Independent Identification Modules (IIM)
Finally, the last  structure identification is composed with many modules IIM as necessary to
cover all the events we want to identify.
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4. FUZZY SYSTEM IN DETERMINING CONFIDENCE DEGREE
In the theory of fuzzy logic, there is a membership degree of every element to a given
conjunct. A fuzzy set is a precise or exact (crisp) conjunct  with inaccurate limits (fuzzy ). In
this work, the reliabiltty is realized through the linguistic model, using a fuzzy interference
system (FIS) Mandani-type [4]. Fuzzy inference is the process of formulating the mapping
from the input to give an output using fuzzy logic. The mapping from which decisions can be
made, or patterns discerned. The process of fuzzy inference involves: membership function,
fuzzy logic operator, and if-then rules.
In order to provide the confidence diagnosis degree of ANN, it was used a system based on
fuzzy logic. To this end, it was proposed a basic fuzzy module for each BNM of the IIM,
Figure 3. With the purpose of define the confidence level of the event presented by the BNM,
the module compares the output fuzzy submitted by the MNB with their respective outputs
presented by the other BNM fot the same IIM.
The confidence level is determined by using the deviation Dev. The fuzzy structure of each
module takes as input the deviations Dev obtained for each event.
4.1.  Formação do Conjunto Nebuloso
To get the comparison between the BNM outputs, it was defined as input variables the
linguistic ones such as Module Event  to test the pertinence degree of the current event in the
MNB, Besides, there are the linguistic variables, Event_1, Event_2 and Event_3 to test the
same event pertinence at the others BNM at the same IIM. As the variable output was used
the linguistic variable Confidence_Degree. Below, all these variables will be described .
          Figure 4: Module_Event                                 Figure 5:Event_1 , 2 and 3
figure 3:  IIM , each pair represents the specialist module formation.
ev
_ _




Once the inputs have been fuzzied, we know the degree to wich each part of the antecedent
has been satisfied for each rule. If the antecedent of a given rule has more than one part, the
fuzzy operator is applied to obtain one number that represents  the result of the antecedent
forthat rule. This number will then be applied to the output function. The fuzzy operator used
in this work is AND (minimum).
The fuzzy logic rules are empirical, formed with logical thinking. To demonstrate this
argument will be presented in table 2 some features of logical rules.













































AND  Is not
event 3
THEN No confident
For each data sample presented to the system, the fuzzy rules are fired at different degree,
resulting in five different confidence degree  values for porcentagem in five fuzzy sets: little
confident, no confident, medium confident, confident, very confident.
Since decisions are based on the testing of all the rules in an FIS, the rules must be combined
in some manner in order to make a decision.  Aggregation is the process by which the fuzzy
sets  that represent the outputs of each rule are combined into a single fuzzy set.
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Finally, the defuzzification process receives as input the aggregation output fuzzy set and
produces a single number as output (Confidence degree).
5. METHOD APLICATION ON TRANSIENT IDENTIFICATION
The data of accidents were recorded in the Human Interface Laboratory, located in the IEN
(Instituto de Energia Nuclear), through the Human System Interface Simulator. Four nuclear
accidents were simulated, LOCA (loss of coolant accident), SGTR (Steam Generator TRIP),
MFW (malfunction feedwater) Turbine trip, in addition to the Normal mode. It was simulated
with the initial condition of 100% of power in time of two minutes, and, after 10s, the accident
occurred.
We obtained values of 12 variables, every second, representing the performance, at the following
spaces, in a PWR plant.
Table 1: Variables description
Point ID Description
UHOLEG2 Hot-Leg #2 temperature
UCOLEG2 Cold-Leg #2 Temperature
ZINST80 Loop 2 flow
ZINST71 S/G 2 level (wide)
ZINST77 S/G 2 level (narrow)
ZINST74 S/G 2 pressure






Steam line #2 flow




5.1. ANN trainning and System Parameters Determination
In this section, we show how the system was designed to be applied in the accident identification
belonging to plant operation conditions chosen to 100% of rated power. Among the transients, the
TRIPTUR accident was chosen as unknown event, and thus, not part of the ANN training set.
To form the ANN training set, 428 standards were set without noise, with noise standards in
2140 to 1%, 5% and 10% each. Totaling the use of 6848 standards.
We show how the system was designed to be applied in the accidents identification pertaining
to operation conditions of the plant chosen to 100% of rated power. Among the transients,
accident Gallery Administrator was chosen as unknown event and thus not part of the training
ANNs.
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To form the training set of RNAs, 428 standards were set without noise, with noise standards
in 2140 to 1%, 5% and 10% each. Totaling the use of 6848 standards.
To set the size of the window and all parameters of ANNs, it took several tests, since there is
a general criterion, well-defined choice for these parameters. After these attempts, the ANNs
that provided the best results showed the following configuration:
• input layer consisting of 60 neurons with linear activation functions (12 "time windows
mobile" with five members each);
• 1 tier with 103 neurons with logistic activation functions;
• output layer with 2 neurons with the activation of type logistics.
5.2. Fuzzy Logic
For each accident, was created a system of fuzzy logic, amounting to a total of 4 fuzzy sets.
Then, the variables used in the module are from the set of operating conditions of the plant,
they are: LOCA, MFW, NORMAL and SGTR. We decided to introduce these variables as
input to the fuzzy model.
5.3.   System phase operation
The test system, shown below, is justified by the need to conduct an system evaluation
response for each module of neuro-fuzzy. Was thus generated for the group of an accident
(LOCA, SGTR and MFW) and condition (NORMAL) power plant, a total of 535 new
patterns representing the events and were included in the training phase (by adding, for each
accident new noises to the state variables). In addition to 535 new patterns representing the
Gallery Administrator accident, which was not included in the training phase.
In each accident, we calculated the maximum deviation  Dev  for each 535 patterns, whose
value was incorporated into the fuzzy system to provide the degree of confidence in the
system. This set of standards represents the condition of an accident.
The  Dev value was achieved by performing a calculation of the values provided by the basic
neural module (BNM), after testing the set of standards of the accident. Be subtracted from,
the expected BNM output value obtained by the basic neural module. After analyzing the
figures, that was chosen with the greatest difference, which in turn is found by comparing the
two modules, according to their occurrence and the exact moment of time. Next, we selected
the values for the same time, the other three remaining basic neural modules.
First, in tables 2 and 3 present the final response of the independent identification module
(IIM) to the accident Gallery Administrator (not belonging to the scope of training) with
noise of 1% and 15%.
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Table 2: Test the accident MII unknown at time 68s .
 TRIPITUR accident with noise of 1%
Greater deviation  Dev Fuzzy Reliability (%)
Network LOCA 0.875       5%       LOCA accident
Network MFW 0.727    25,5%     MFW accident
Network NORMAl 0.970      0%        NORMAL condition
Network SGTR              0,970     6,32%    SGTR accident
Table 3:  Test MII accident unknown at time 98s.
  TRIPITUR accident with noise of 20%
Greater deviation ( Dev )  Fuzzy Reliability   (%)
 LOCA Network 1.302       0%        LOCA accident
 MFW Network 1,247       0%       MFW accident
 NORMAL Network 1,463       0%        NORMAL condition
 SGTR Network                 1,344       0%       SGTR accident
For the final test of the system, we used a set of standards. However, the first five patterns in
this set represent the condition of normality in transition and the last 530 standards already
represent the condition of an accident. This provision is intended to simulate a transition
between the normal condition and a condition of an accident, thus serving to verify the
system's capacity to properly synchronize the change of the event. Tables 4, show such a
transition.
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Table 4: Transition from NORMAL to LOCA with noise of 1%
 Dev at time 1s Fuzzy Reliability
 LOCA Network 0,998       0%   LOCA accident
MFW Network 0,991        0 %   MFW accident
 NORMAL Network 0,026       100 % NORMAL condition
SGTR Network             0,991       6,32%  SGTR accident
Dev at time 2s Fuzzy Reliability
 LOCA Network 0,361       72,5%   LOCA accident
 MFW Network 1,291        2,5 %   MFW accident
 NORMAL Network 1,119        2 %   NORMAL condition
 SGTR Network             1,720        6,85%   SGTR accident
 Dev at time 3s Fuzzy Reliability
 LOCA Network 0,118       94,5%   LOCA accident
 MFW Network 1,344        0 %   MFW accident
 NORMAL Network 1,136        0 %  NORMAL condition
 SGTR Network            1,645        6,32 %   SGTR accident
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Most of the responses of the system (more than 50% certainty) showed significant indication
of the reliability of a given transient, even in uncertainty situations (the simulated noise
added). Offering this information type, even in a noisy background, with a events number , an
operator can direct your attention to the most likely event, reducing their search field and
centralizing their options and thus providing a further investigation rapid and effective event
Dev at time 4s Fuzzy Reliability
LOCA Network 0,154 72%   LOCA accident
MFW Network 1,459 0 %   MFW accident
NORMAL Network 1,178 0 %   NORMAL condition
SGTR Network 1,432 6,32%  SGTR accident
Dev at time 5s Fuzzy Reliability
LOCA Network 0,175 72%   LOCA accident
MFW Network 1,445 0 %   MFW accident
NORMAL Network 1,141 0 %  NORMAL condition
SGTR Network 1,023 6,32%  SGTR accident
Dev at time 6s Fuzzy Reliability
LOCA Network 0,034 100%   LOCA accident
MFW Network 0,901 3,5 %  MFW accident
NORMAL Network 0,998 0 %    NORMAL condition
SGTR network 0,994 6,32%  SGTR accident
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that is occurring. The next step is to extend the method to a larger set of accidents, making it
also capable of identifying variations of the same accident.
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